

**BEFORE
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
SOUTH CAROLINA**

DOCKET NO. 2019-365-E

In the Matter of:)
)
Exploration of a South Carolina)
Competitive Procurement Program as)
Allowed by South Carolina Code)
Section 58-41-20(E)(2))
)
)

**RESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF STEVEN J. LEVITAS
ON BEHALF OF
THE SOUTH CAROLINA SOLAR BUSINESS ALLIANCE, INC.**

I. INTRODUCTION

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. Steven J. Levitas. My business address is 130 Roberts Street, Asheville, North Carolina 28801.

Q. ARE YOU THE SAME STEVEN LEVITAS WHO FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS DOCKET ON FEBRUARY 22, 2021?

A. I am. Today I am filing reply testimony responding to points raised by other witnesses.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF YOUR RESPONSIVE TESTIMONY.

A. As the Commission considers how to proceed in this docket, it will find a surprising level of agreement among the parties about the benefits of competitive procurement, and the general elements and aims that such programs should have. In light of the testimony received, the Commission is in a sound position to determine that competitive procurement of renewable resources is in the public interest, and to approve guidelines that will inform forthcoming procurements by South Carolina's investor-owned electric utilities. My testimony today responds to some of the points raised by other witnesses and notes the wide areas of agreement.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. My direct testimony discussed the public benefits of, and the growing trend toward, competition in generation procurement around the country; the process for identifying resources to be procured using integrated resource planning; issues raised by utility participation in competitive solicitations; and program design. On this last point, I submitted proposed guidelines addressing independent administration, interconnection and system upgrade costs, market information transparency, and use of pre-approved form

1 contracts. Finally, I recommended that the Commission adopt an approach similar to North
2 Carolina's CPRE program in the near term and consider migrating to an "all source"
3 procurement program similar to that utilized in Colorado over the longer term.

4 The testimony submitted by other witnesses reinforces the benefits of competitive
5 procurement and best practices for a well-run program. As I discuss below, there is general
6 agreement that well-run competitive procurement programs can deliver benefits for
7 ratepayers through market-based price discipline. Second, there seems to be consensus that
8 integrated resource planning provides a ready mechanism for identifying resource needs
9 that competitive solicitation can meet. Third, the parties agree on the need for information
10 transparency, pre-approved form contracts, and clarity on interconnection and upgrade
11 costs to ensure fairness and efficiency. And fourth, there is common recognition that
12 measures are needed to address utility participation in the utility's own auction, although
13 different opinions have been offered on how best to address that issue. I stand by my
14 recommendation to follow the approach used in North Carolina's CPRE program, with an
15 independent administrator carrying out the solicitation working closely with the utility and
16 with Commission oversight.

17 **Q. IS THERE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES THAT COMPETITIVE**
18 **PROCUREMENT OF ELECTRIC GENERATION RESOURCES CAN DELIVER**
19 **RATEPAYER BENEFITS?**

20 **A.** There seems to be. As I noted in my direct testimony, free markets and fair competition
21 promote innovation and efficiency – forces that ultimately lower consumer costs. That is
22 why much of the country has moved to organized wholesale electrical generation markets
23 that feature regular auctions for energy and capacity together with open access transmission

1 tariffs. These wholesale markets are successfully meeting security and reliability
2 requirements while delivering affordable, competitively priced electricity to consumers.
3 DESC Witness Kassis agrees that competitive procurement programs have been
4 implemented to accelerate and “more cost-effectively advance policy objectives such as
5 the adoption of renewable generation” (Kassis at 6) while SACE/SCCL Witness Sercy cites
6 numerous benefits of competitive procurement including least-cost procurement, design
7 flexibility, price discovery, and alignment with utility planning, and agrees with the
8 observation made on page 21 of this Commission’s Order 2020-832 that “[c]ompetitive
9 procurement of [near term solar and/or storage] generation resources creates an opportunity
10 for ratepayer savings.” (Sercy at 8.) In addition to the competitive procurements mentioned
11 in my testimony (in North Carolina, Virginia, Colorado, and Michigan), Witness Sercy
12 notes that programs have been successfully undertaken by Georgia Power, the Tennessee
13 Valley Authority (TVA), Florida Municipal Power Agency, as well as Santee Cooper and
14 Central Electric Power Cooperative here in South Carolina. (Sercy at 9.) Renewable RFPs
15 are also underway in Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, Montana, Nevada, Arizona, and California
16 according to an industry publication keeping track of current requests for proposals RFPs).¹

¹ <https://solarindustrymag.com/category/solar-news/rfp> (accessed February 27, 2021).

1 In short, thanks to the benefits it brings to ratepayers, competitive procurement is a
2 pervasive and growing utility best-practice for generation procurement.

3 **Q. DO OTHER WITNESSES AGREE ON THE USE OF INTEGRATED**
4 **RESOURCE PLANS AS FORMING A BASIS FOR COMPETITIVE**
5 **PROCUREMENTS?**

6 **A.** Yes. In the absence of a legislative body mandating a defined procurement goal, as in
7 Virginia and North Carolina, the integrated resource planning (IRP) process can determine
8 how much and what type of new generation should be procured. Dominion witness Koujak
9 notes that competitive solicitation can be used to satisfy needs identified in an IRP or which
10 are identified by a state directive, such as the directives I mentioned in Virginia and North
11 Carolina. (Koujak at 5, 7.) Witness Brown similarly agrees that traditionally, volume is
12 based on IRP-demonstrated needs, and that absent a showing of need the volume of
13 procurement could be established through consideration of a variety of factors spelled out
14 in state policy or law, as happened in North Carolina. (Brown at 14.) Witness Brown also
15 correctly observes that, even in the absence of capacity need that can be filled by
16 renewables, an IRP can select the resource as a potential economic source of energy
17 without changing the total amount of resource required to meet peak demand. (Brown at
18 21.) Witness Sercy details how an IRP can inform design of a competitive procurement
19 program by, for example, identifying procurement volumes and timing, cost cap levels,
20 and technologies to emphasize. (Sercy at 16.) As stated in my opening testimony, South

1 Carolina's new, robust IRP process as overseen and implemented by this Commission
2 provides a ready platform for the use of competitive procurement.

3 **Q. IS THERE AGREEMENT THAT COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS SHOULD BE**
4 **TRANSPARENT, HAVE CLEAR BIDDER GUIDELINES, AND PRODUCE**
5 **PUBLIC RESULTS?**

6 **A.** There appears to be. As explained in my opening testimony, the utility undertaking an RFP
7 should provide information about the areas on its transmission system most likely to
8 experience congestion and require network upgrades, and the most advantageous points of
9 interconnection. I agree with DESC Koujak's testimony that access to bidding information
10 should support a "level playing field" (Koujak at 12), and believe such access is all the
11 more essential where non-price factors he mentions such as locational benefits and
12 transmission availability (Koujak at 5) are used to evaluate bids. Unlike the other non-
13 price factors he mentions (financial strength, operating experience, and other indicators of
14 readiness), information about generation and transmission system benefits and challenges
15 will reside with the utility seeking the competitive procurement. Given this lopsided access
16 to information, timely bidder access to relevant information is essential to establishing a
17 "level playing field" for competition. Further, it is essential to have public review of draft
18 solicitations and their terms as well as public reporting on solicitation participation and
19 pricing ranges – elements that DESC witness Koujak identifies as best practices. (Koujak
20 at 15.)

21 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH DESC WITNESS KOUJAK'S RECOMMENDATION**
22 **FOR GENERAL PROCUREMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF**
23 **RFPs?**

1 **A.** I do. DESC Witness Koujak testifies in support of “general procurement guidelines for
2 the conduct of RFPs, ensuring that decisions are rendered with integrity, transparency,
3 and fairness,” and to “ensure a consistent and fair evaluation” recommends evaluation
4 guidance “that sets the course for the qualitative and quantitative evaluation prior to
5 evaluation of bids.” (Koujak at 12.) I agree with these recommendations but believe the
6 appropriate body to set general guidelines is the Commission, not the utility, for several
7 reasons. First, the statute giving rise to this proceeding authorizes the Commission to
8 open a docket for “creating programs” for the competitive procurement of energy and
9 capacity from renewable energy facilities within the respective utilities’ balancing
10 authority areas where the Commission finds such action to be in the public interest. S.C.
11 Code Ann. § 58-41-10(E)(2). In creating such programs, the Commission must establish
12 guidelines to ensure that the programs function to achieve the Commission’s intended
13 results.

14 Second, having high-level guidelines for RFPs that are consistent across utilities
15 will be administratively simpler for both this Commission and for participants.

16 Competitive procurements are complex enough without adding inconsistent guidelines
17 and practices among utilities (to say nothing of this Commission having to resolve the
18 same high-level questions about procurement structure in three separate dockets).

19 Finally, although the details may differ to account for differences in the utilities’
20 respective systems and resource needs, there is simply no reason for the high-level
21 structure and parameters of procurement to be inconsistent from one utility to the next.
22 The guidelines set forth in my testimony are consistent with the CPRE program already
23 in use by Duke to obtain renewable energy for hundreds of thousands of South Carolina

1 ratepayers. The Commission should adopt those guidelines and thereby position Duke
2 and DESC to be fully prepared to launch competitive procurements once the results of
3 their IRPs are finalized.

4 **Q. IS THERE AGREEMENT THAT COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS SHOULD BE**
5 **CONDUCTED BASED ON NON-NEGOTIABLE FORM CONTRACT**
6 **DOCUMENTS?**

7 **A.** There may be. As noted in my testimony and as recognized by other witnesses, PPAs,
8 Build-Own-Transfer Agreements, and Engineering, Procurement and Construction
9 Agreements all contain non-price terms that significantly affect the economics of the
10 transaction and the value of the project to the utility and its ratepayers. These include
11 performance security requirements, force majeure provisions and definitions, and cure
12 rights for events of default. If these terms are subject to negotiation, the bid prices of
13 market participants cannot be compared on an apples-to apples basis and contract
14 negotiation may prolong and complicate the award process. Commercially reasonable
15 form contracts can and should be approved by the Commission, just as they were by the
16 North Carolina Utilities Commission for CPRE and by this Commission for PURPA
17 transactions under Act 62. Dispatchability and curtailment terms, which if left uncertain
18 can make it difficult if not impossible to finance projects, should be addressed either by
19 limiting uncompensated curtailment, as was done with CPRE or by structuring PPA
20 payments based on the capacity made available to the utility rather than the amount of
21 output that the utility actually requires from the facility.

22 **Q. IS THERE AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF**
23 **COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS?**

1 **A.** There appears to be agreement that independent oversight is needed, but the proper degree
2 of oversight should be resolved by the Commission. My testimony proposed guidelines
3 for the Commission’s consideration based heavily on North Carolina’s CPRE program,
4 and included the selection and role of an Independent Administrator as well as guidelines
5 for communications between market participants and the structure and process for
6 conducting the competitive solicitation. Given the issues identified above with regard to
7 utility or affiliates participating in competitive solicitations, their access to material
8 information regarding network conditions that inform bid pricing and selection, and the
9 utility’s interest increasing market share, the best practice is to have a fully independent
10 administrator (“IA”) execute the RFP process, as is done with CPRE. While Witness
11 Koujak agrees there should be “appropriate” oversight to ensure “fairness and
12 transparency” (Koujak at 8), he seems to take issue with the concept of independent
13 administration (Koujak at 10). While it is true that utilities possess information essential
14 to an informed RFP structure and bid evaluation, as he notes, that information can be
15 transmitted to the IA as in CPRE, and it is the possession of that information (which can
16 inform affiliate bids and their evaluation) that renders independent administration all the
17 more essential. With respect to information about “interconnection requirements” and “the
18 level of detailed modelling required to conduct an all-source RFP” that Mr. Koujak
19 believes can only be provided by the utility, I would respond that a well-designed RFP can
20 allow the utility to provide that information and analysis to an IA while still addressing
21 competitiveness concerns.

22 **Q. WHAT IS “QUEUE REFORM” AND HOW DOES IT RELATE TO**
23 **COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS?**

1 **A.** As my testimony explained, the Commission has approved major changes to the procedures
2 governing Duke's study of interconnection requests, and Dominion is in the process of
3 developing similar changes. These new procedures, generally referred to as "queue
4 reform," replace sequential study of interconnection requests with the study of such
5 requests in defined clusters, with the cost of any required network upgrades being spread
6 among participants in the affected cluster. As witness Brown observes, these procedures
7 will facilitate the study of the finalists and ultimate winners in a competitive solicitation
8 being studied collectively. (Brown at 20.) DESC Witness Mainz notes that a proper
9 process should allow ready resources to operate on an "as infrastructure is available" to
10 deliver resource until upgrades are complete. (Mainz at 8.) I would agree, with the caveat
11 that this should not result in truncated contract tenor for the selected project.

12 **Q. IS THERE AGREEMENT THAT UTILITIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMPETE**
13 **IN COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT?**

14 **A.** All parties agree that utilities should be able to participate in competitive procurement, but
15 there is some disagreement on how that should be structured given the utility's access to
16 inside information, the benefits of diversification of ownership, and the risks of rate basing
17 assets. As my testimony explained, rate-basing (*i.e.*, allowing full recovery of the capital
18 costs of an asset plus a defined return on equity) creates a variety of potential risks to
19 ratepayers, including construction delays and cost overruns, operational underperformance
20 and uncertainty about long-term market pricing. I therefore recommend in the near term
21 at least, the approach taken by CPRE, where the utility is allowed to act as a market-
22 participant that competes and recovers costs just like an IPP (*i.e.*, through defined

1 production revenues and for a defined period of time). This arrangement still allows for
2 utility ownership of resources competitively procured in the first instance.

3 **Q. IF UTILITY/AFFILIATE PARTICIPATION IS ALLOWED, SHOULD IT BE**
4 **CAPPED AS IT IS UNDER DUKE’S CPRE PROGRAM?**

5 **A.** Yes. Even with oversight of the procurement process by an independent third party, where
6 the utility and/or its affiliates are allowed to act as a market participant in the competitive
7 process (*i.e.*, to compete for the right to sell to the utility) there is the risk of self-dealing
8 and the appearance of impropriety. That is addressed in part through a cap on the
9 percentage of capacity that can be awarded to the utility in the competitive solicitation,
10 such as CPRE’s 30% cap.

11 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH WITNESS KASSIS’S CHARACTERIZATION IN HIS**
12 **DIRECT TESTIMONY ON PAGE 5 LINES 15 – 18 THAT PURPA REQUIRES**
13 **DESC TO PURCHASE POWER FROM QUALIFYING FACILITIES “WITHOUT**
14 **REGARD FOR NEED, LOCATION, OR IMPACT ON RELIABILITY?”**

15 **A.** No. PURPA provides that Qualifying Facilities (“QFs”) may sell energy and capacity to a
16 utility at the utility’s administratively determined avoided cost rate. DESC’s avoided cost
17 rates are set by this Commission and are intended to accurately reflect the value of QF
18 energy and capacity to the DESC system. If the utility does not have a need for additional
19 capacity, it is not required to pay the QF for the capacity it provides. Utilities always need
20 energy unless their entire fuel supply is covered by long-term, must-take contracts, which
21 is rarely if ever the case.

22 As to location and reliability, S.C. Code Annotated 58-41-20(B)(3) specifically
23 provides for “geographic location” as an appropriate consideration when establishing a

1 utility's methodology for calculating avoided cost rates, and the South Carolina Generator
2 Interconnection Procedures approved by this Commission in 2016 establish the
3 interconnection study process used by DESC to ensure the reliable interconnection and
4 operation of solar facilities on the DESC system.

5 **Q. IS THERE ANY WAY FOR A UTILITY TO AVOID ITS "MUST TAKE"**
6 **OBLIGATION UNDER PURPA?**

7 **A.** Yes. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 13201 et seq. (2005), amended PURPA
8 by adding, among other provisions, Section 210(m). This section allows a utility to apply
9 for a waiver of its mandatory purchase obligation from QFs if it is located in an area where
10 QFs have non-discriminatory access to markets to sell energy and capacity. As
11 implemented by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), utilities in all
12 RTOs/ISOs are eligible to receive such a waiver of the obligation to purchase energy and
13 capacity from QFs larger than 20 MW. The policy rationale of Section 210(m) was that if
14 a QF has a meaningful and non-discriminatory opportunity to sell energy and capacity to
15 buyers other than the utility to which the QF is interconnected, then PURPA's must-
16 purchase requirement would no longer be required. In this way PURPA further supports
17 the development of free and efficient marketplaces for energy and capacity, to the benefit
18 of utility ratepayers.

19 **Q. DOES THIS TYPE OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS TO MARKETS FOR**
20 **ENERGY AND CAPACITY EXIST IN SOUTH CAROLINA?**

21 **A.** Not at present. Under PURPA and FERC's regulations, utilities located outside of
22 RTOs/ISOs are not eligible for a waiver of the mandatory purchase obligation because QFs
23 in those areas have no meaningful opportunity to sell energy and capacity to a buyer other

1 than the monopsony utility. Congress and FERC have maintained that in jurisdictions like
2 South Carolina, PURPA's requirements remain sound public policy.

3 **Q. DOES THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR PURPA IN SOUTH CAROLINA**
4 **CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ROBUST MARKET OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOLAR**
5 **ENERGY INVESTMENT IN DESC'S SERVICE TERRITORY?**

6 **A.** No. A combination of factors has resulted in a dearth of new QF development in DESC
7 territory since 2018. These factors include DESC's low 10-year avoided cost rate,
8 uncertainty around integration costs, and the curtailment risk for energy generated by new
9 QF facilities.

10 **Q. DOES COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE**
11 **MODEL FOR ADDING COST-EFFECTIVE SOLAR ENERGY TO THE DESC**
12 **SYSTEM?**

13 **A.** Yes. As detailed in my direct testimony, modeling conducted in accordance with the
14 creation of an integrated resource plan ("IRP") can identify cost effective opportunities to
15 add clean energy resources to meet a utility's energy and capacity needs in a reliable way
16 that also avoids risk associated with an over-reliance on fossil fuel generators and utility
17 generation ownership. Additionally, the competitive procurement of controlled solar
18 resources can increase the flexibility of those resources to the advantage of utility system
19 operations and result in the elimination or mitigation of curtailment risk for those facilities.

20 And as noted by Duke's witness Mr. Brown, competitive procurement also can be
21 utilized in the implementation of a state's implementation of PURPA. Although FERC has
22 held that competitive procurements cannot be the sole avenue for QFs to pursue their rights
23 under PURPA, states can "channel" PURPA development into voluntary competitive

1 procurements by providing greater revenue certainty in the form of longer contract
2 duration, as well as other terms that are attractive to QFs. Ratepayers can benefit from
3 such procurements by getting renewable energy at competitively-set rates below avoided
4 cost, and utilities benefit if the contracts include terms desirable to utilities, such as limited
5 dispatchability rights, that are not normally available in PURPA contracts.

6 Of course, effective regulatory oversight is required to ensure that such
7 procurements do not undermine QFs' PURPA rights or otherwise run afoul of FERC
8 requirements. Such procurements would also have to comport with the requirements of
9 Act 62.

10 As I mentioned in my Direct Testimony, I was the principal author of a detailed
11 proposal made by the Solar Energy Industries Association to the FERC, to allow for the
12 use of appropriately designed and implemented competitive solicitations as an alternative
13 to traditional PURPA implementation. FERC largely adopted SEIA's proposal in the final
14 version of the revised PURPA regulations that were promulgated last year in Order No.
15 872.

16 Although SCSBA does not recommend that the Commission direct competitive
17 procurement as an extension of South Carolina's PURPA implementation in this docket,
18 this is an issue that may be explored in the biennial avoided cost dockets that will
19 commence later this year.

20 **Q. HOW DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT THE COMMISSION PROCEED IN THIS**
21 **DOCKET?**

22 **A.** My high-level recommendations for the implementation of competitive procurement of
23 renewable resources in South Carolina are summarized in Section VI of my Prefiled Direct

1 Testimony. In terms of process, I recommend that the Commission open a docket to
2 consider rulemaking relating to the coordinated resource need planning and competitive
3 procurement of all generation resources (not just renewable), utilizing Colorado's all-
4 source procurement program as a starting point. Realistically, this process could take
5 several years.

6 In the interim, to address the near-term competitive procurement of renewable
7 energy resources authorized by Act 62 that is the subject of this proceeding, I recommend
8 that the Commission issue an Order in this docket providing that, until such time as more
9 comprehensive rules on competitive procurement in effect, the competitive procurement
10 of renewable resources by utilities subject to the Commission's jurisdiction shall be
11 conducted consistent with the guidelines provided in Exhibit SJL-11 to my Direct Prefiled
12 Testimony, as they may be modified by the Commission based on input from ORS and
13 other interested parties.

14 I further recommend that the Commission open utility-specific dockets to address
15 the procurement of renewable resources as authorized by Act 62, and establish a procedural
16 schedule in each docket, commencing promptly after approval of the utility's final IRP, to
17 establish the parameters for procurement of renewable resources in its balancing area.

18 This would be a two-stage proceeding. The first stage would address a narrow set
19 of issues, including (1) the proposed size and scope of the procurement; and (2) the
20 appointment of an Independent Administrator (subject to Commission approval after
21 comment from interested parties).

22 After the appointment of an IA, the utility and the IA can, in consultation with
23 stakeholders, develop evaluation criteria, a request for proposal (RFP) document setting

1 forth a process consistent with the guidelines in Exhibit SJL-11, and pro forma PPAs and
2 other contract documents. In the second phase of the proceeding, the RFP and pro forma
3 contracts would be filed for Commission approval, after giving other parties the
4 opportunity for intervention, discovery, filed comments or testimony, and an evidentiary
5 hearing.

6 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

7 **A. Yes it does.**